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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE EXPANSION
AND INTEGRATION: A PROPOSED BALANCING
TEST*
I. INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine' is premised on the concept
that the public's interest in certain natural resources' is a
property right,' which both restricts the sovereign's power as
trustee," and subrogates private ownership rights in favor of
public use rights.5 The California Supreme Court in two re-
© Ted J. Hannig
* The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Mary Lynne
Thaxter and Barbara J.S. Kalhammer.
1. For additional views on the public trust doctrine, see generally Conference
Proceedings, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law and Management.
(C. Dunning, ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Conference Proceedings]; The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C.D. L.
REV. 181 (1980); Eikel & Williams, The Public Trust Doctrine and the California
Coastline, 6 URB. LAW. 519 (1974); Parker, History, Politics and the Law of the Cali-
fornia Tidelands Trust, 4 W. ST. U.L. REV. 149 (1977); Sax, The Public Trust Doc-
trine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473
(1970); Comment, California's Tidelands Trust for Modifiable Public Purposes, 6
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 485 (1973); Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater Re-
source Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25 RUTGERs L. REV. 571, 576-649
[hereinafter cited as Note, State Citizen Rights]; Note, California's Tideland Trust:
Shoring it up, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (1971); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A
Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Public Trust in Tidal Areas]. For a perspective which differs from the
author's, see Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The
Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63 (1982).
2. These natural resources, oceans, tidelands, and swamps, historically have
been associated with water. However, modern commentators are suggesting the appli-
cation of the public trust doctrine to other natural resources. See Conference Pro-
ceedings, supra note 1, at 244.
3. Courts and commentators have generally treated this right as an easement or
servitude. See, e.g., Comment, Public Access and the California Coastal Commission:
A Question of Over-reaching, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 395, 404 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Public Access]; Littman, Tidelands: -Trusts, Easements, Custom
and Implied Dedication, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 279 (1977); see also Marks v.
Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); Bohn v. Albertson, 107
Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951).
4. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892); Marks v.
Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971);
Colberg, Inc. v. California, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 416, 432 P.2d 3, 10, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 408
(1967).
5. These rights typically have been defined as the right of commerce, naviga-
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cent cases applied the public trust doctrine to more than
4,000 miles of California's nontidal shorezone property.' The
supreme court, in State v. Superior Court (Lyon)7 and State
v. Superior Court (Fogerty),' (hereinafter collectively referred
to as "the Lake Cases"), recognized for the first time that
public trust rights can be acquired by prescription.'
The ancient and nebulous public trust doctrine can be
traced back to Roman law which recognized public rights in
the seas and rivers.'0 Later, England applied the doctrine to
that area where the tide "ebbed and flowed."" The modern
public trust doctrine applied in the United States developed
from English common law." This two thousand year old doc-
trine is imbued with as much lore and confusion as were the
sea dragons once rumored to exist in the same waters. Unlike
mythical sea creatures, however, the public trust doctrine is
worthy of close scrutiny because it is a vital component of
public and private property rights and natural resource law.
The impact of the Lake Cases on both public rights and
private property is staggering. Californians now have new
rights of use, enjoyment, and preservation in millions of acres
of valuable land.' 3 As a result, hundreds of thousands of prop-
erty titles have been clouded." The Lake Cases have made a
significant impact on natural resource law and property law
by strengthening and expanding the public trust doctrine.
Despite this formidable victory for proponents of the
public trust doctrine, the true nature and extent of this doc-
trine in California remains unclear. The confusion is largely
attributable to the doctrine's two thousand year history and
tion, fishing, recreation, and preservation under recent California case law. See infra
text accompanying notes 91-100.
6. The "shorezone" is the area between the normal season high-water and low-
water marks. In State v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 216, 625 P.2d 239, 172
Cal. Rptr. 696, 699, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1094 (1981), which involved Clear Lake, the
court observed that 5,000 acres of property existed in the shorezone. Id.
7. 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1094
(1981).
8. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1094
(1981).
9. Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d at 248, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
10. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
12. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
13. Lyon, 29 Cal. 2d at 233, 625 P.2d at 253, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (Clark, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
14. Id.; see also infra note 77.
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application in diverse legal systems.
This comment briefly explores and assesses the essential
points in the public trust doctrine's historical development,
proposing that states have utilized five legal techniques either
to expand or to limit the common law concept of public trust
rights.15 It will then demonstrate that the California Supreme
Court's holding in the Lake Cases adopted a sixth method by
which public trust rights can be expanded: application of the
public trust doctrine by prescription.16 The comment argues
that the court applied the public trust doctrine to millions of
acres of valuable California lakeside and riparian land without
adequate analysis, and contrary to the legislature's intent.17
Conflicts among various public trust rights, such as
between fishing rights and open space preservation, are cur-
rently resolved by balancing one recognized trust use against
another.'8 This balancing test, however, fails to take into ac-
count agricultural, residential, and other private and non-
trust uses.19 It will be shown that the application of the public
trust doctrine by prescription to productive private property"
deprives property owners of reasonable use of their land. The
need for a new balancing test has been accentuated by the
California Supreme Court's recent integration of the public
trust doctrine and the water rights system.2 1 This comment
proposes a more equitable test for resolving conflicts between
public and private uses of trust land. The proposed test can
similarly be used in balancing public trust rights against water
appropriation. This comment concludes with an analysis of
potential future applications of the public trust doctrine.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The first step in understanding modern public trust doc-
trine law is to understand the doctrine's unique legal history.
15. See infra notes 52-110 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 111-42 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 139-42.
18. See Ex parte Bailey, 155 Cal. 472, 476, 101 P. 441, 442-43 (1909).
19. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 235, 625 P.2d at 254, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (Clark, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
20. Id. at 236, 625 P.2d at 255, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
21. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
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The literature is replete with informative accounts of the
early history of the public trust doctrine.22 While such a de-
tailed historical analysis is beyond the scope of this comment,
an appreciation of current public trust issues requires a basic
understanding of the public trust doctrine's evolution through
a variety of legal systems.
A. Roman Law
Most commentators 2 trace the public trust doctrine back
to Roman law, which provided that: "No one therefore is for-
bidden access to the seashore . . . , all rivers and harbours
are public, so that all persons have a right to fish therein. '2 4
Roman law also recognized that roads, public buildings, and
"all things of which the property is in the community and the
use in the members of the community' 2 were subject to a
vested personal servitude held by members of the public .'
B. English Common Law
Public trust doctrine law in the United States developed
from the early American courts' perception of the English
common law.2 7 The early American judiciary generally be-
lieved that English common law applied the public trust only
to areas where the tide "ebbed and flowed." It was further
believed that the King as sovereign could not grant tidal prop-
erty into absolute private ownership because of jus publicum,
the public trust rights with which those properties were im-
pressed.28 While there is evidence that these broad generali-
ties were of doubtful validity,"' these perceptions by the
American judicial system have been so consistently adopted in
22. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 1, at 149-53; Note, Public Trust in Tidal Ar-
eas, supra note 1, at 763-74; Note, State Citizen Rights, supra note 1, at 576-649.
23. See, e.g., Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Be-
comes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 195 (1980); Note, State
Citizens Rights, supra note 1, at 576.
24. INST. JUST., 2.1.1-2.1.6, quoted in Note, Public Trust in Tidal Areas, supra
note 1, at 763-64.
25. GAvIs, INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 128 (E. Poste trans. 1904).
26. Id.
27. Stevens, supra note 23, at 198; see also Shiveley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1893); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
28. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 415 (1892).
29. See Annot., 23 A.L.R. 757, 757-59 (1923).
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formulating American public trust doctrine law as to require
viewing the above perceptions as valid.
With one notable exception," modern public trust doc-
trine law in the United States has been based on the English
common law's "ebb and flow" of the tide test,"1 and therefore
has sometimes been referred to as the "tidelands trust"
doctrine.8 2
C. Early Public Trust Doctrine Rights in the United States
1. Establishment of a Public Right
That the public must have some claim of right of owner-
ship in the property in question is regarded as axiomatic.33 In
1842, Chief Justice Taney, writing for the United States Su-
30. While the basic rule remains that modern public trust doctrine rights are
based on perceptions of English common law, there is one exception which directly
affects certain titles in California. Property held by successors in interest to Mexican
land grants was generally believed to be free of the public trust, "a limitation result-
ing from the duty resting upon the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo (9 Stat. 922), and also under principles of international law, to protect all
rights of property which had emanated from the Mexican Government prior to the
treaty. [Citations omitted]." Borax Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 (1935). The
more proper analysis may be that under Spanish law, as applied in Mexico, public
trust rights were recognized.
The California Supreme Court has held Mexican grants subject to the trust. City
of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 599 (1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1983) (No. 82-708).
The United States Supreme Court has, however, granted certiorari in this case. Id.
The two major issues presented for the United States Supreme Court's review are: 1)
whether California can collaterally attack the 1851 Act patent proceedings' factual
determination that the grant land was not tidelands, and 2) whether the United
States silently reserved a public trust interest in the Mexican grant land, to which the
State of California succeeded. 51 U.S.L.W. 3466 (1983).
Assuming that the Court rules that California may collaterally attack the factual
determination that the grant land was tidelands, the public trust issue may be moot.
If the federal government did not reserve the trust (which would likely be a breach of
its duty as trustee and contrary to the great weight of authority), then the State of
California could, under the Lake Cases holding, claim public trust rights by
prescription.
31. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1893).
32. See, e.g., Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 226, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705
(referring to "the venerable doctrine of the tidelands trust" before applying it to non-
tidal lands).
33. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 307, 644
P.2d 792, 804, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 611 (1982) (Richardson, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1983) (No. 82-708). This claim can be an
easement or servitude. See supra note 3. Another claim of right is by equitable title.
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties & Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 306 P.2d 824 (1957),
rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
preme Court in Martin v. Waddell,34 upheld the public's com-
mon use right in navigable waters of the original states:
For when the Revolution took place, the people of each
state became themselves sovereign; and in that character
hold the absolute right to all navigable waters, and the
soils under them, for their own common use, subject only
to the rights surrendered by the constitution to the gen-
eral government. 5
Although Martin upheld public trust rights, these rights
suffered from three potential limitations. First, the Court
ruled only as to the original thirteen states. Second, navigable
waters were defined as those subject to the tides' ebb and
flow, regardless of navigability in fact. Finally, the Court did
not charge the state with a trusteeship duty, a critical factor
in the modern public trust doctrine.
The first potential limitation was eliminated when the
Supreme Court later held that the equal footing doctrine 6
confirms to all states title in navigable waters and the soils
beneath them. The second limitation, defining "navigable
waters" as those subject to the tides' "ebb and flow," was
eliminated by the Court in 1870.38 The Court announced a
new federal test which would be used in determining what
"navigable waters" the states took title to upon their admis-
sion to the Union: "Those rivers must be regarded as public
navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they
are navigable in fact when they are used, or susceptible of be-
ing used, in their ordinary condition in the customary modes
of trade and travel on water." 3'
2. Illinois Central Railroad: A New Track to Follow
The United States Supreme Court removed the third and
34. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
35. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
36. The "equal footing doctrine" provides that all states joining the Union do so
on an equal footing with the original states. "Upon the admission of California into
the Union upon equal footing with the original States, absolute property in, and do-
minion and sovereignty over, all soils within her limits passed to the State ...."
Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65-66 (1873) (reaffirming Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845)).
37. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 57 (1894).
38. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
39. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
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final potential limitation of Martin in the 1892 case of Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois." The Court charged the state
with specific trusteeship duties under the public trust doc-
trine. Illinois Central was characterized by the California Su-
preme Court in 198011 as the "seminal" public trust case"2 and
the "primary authority even today. ' 4- One noted authority on
the public trust doctrine has further highlighted Illinois Cen-
tral's importance by referring to it as the "lodestar" of Ameri-
can public trust law."
Illinois Central involved a grant by the Illinois State Leg-
islature of 1,000 acres of Lake Michigan's shorezone and sub-
merged lands,45 "representing virtually the entire waterfront
of Chicago."' 4' Later, the state legislature had a change of po-
litical heart and repealed the act granting the land to the rail-
road.47 The U. S. Supreme Court, in one of its few public trust
doctrine opinions, declared the repeal of the grant was valid.
The Court first described the public trust nature of the
title which the state held: "It is a title held in trust for the
people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have the liberty of
fishing therein freed from obstruction or interference of pri-
vate parties. "48
Thus, the Court announced not only the state was a trus-
tee, but also recognized three public trust rights: navigation,
commerce, and fishing. The Court further affirmed the pub-
lic's protection against a state's alienation of the trust prop-
erty title, an issue which arose in the Lake Cases. "The con-
trol of the State for the purpose of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the inter-
ests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without sub-
stantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and
40. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
41. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327 (1980).
42. Id. at 521, 606 P.2d at 365, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
43. Id.
44. Sax, supra note 1, at 489.
45. 146 U.S. at 405 n.1; see City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d at
521, 606 P.2d at 365, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (summarizing Illinois Central).
46. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d at 521, 606 P.2d at 365, 162
Cal. Rptr. at 330.
47. 146 U.S. at 410.
48. Id. at 452.
19831
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water remaining."' 9
Illinois Central was limited on its facts to application to
tidal property and the Great Lakes, which were described by
the Court as "possess[ing] all the general characteristics of the
open seas, except in freshness, and in the absence of the ebb
and flow of the tide." 50
3. Beyond Illinois Central: State Determination
So long as the minimum standards of Illinois Central are
met, it remains a matter of state common law as to what wa-
ters or other resources are subject the the public trust doc-
trine. Further, the states have the ability to expand the pub-
lic's rights beyond the historically recognized commerce,
navigation, and fishing rights. The liberty of states to deter-
mine the terms and extent of the public trust doctrine beyond
Illinois Central has resulted in various interpretations."
Five techniques have been used by states to expand or
limit the common law concept of public trust rights: express
constitutional or statutory provision; determination of title to
nontidal waters; definition of "navigable waters;" definition of
public trust right, and integration with the appropriation and
riparian water rights system.
The public trust doctrine in California has undergone
rapid expansion by extensive use of each technique and a
sixth technique, public trust rights by prescription, has been
added by the California Supreme Court.
III. THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE: FIVE METHODS OF TEACH-
ING AN OLD DOCTRINE NEW RIGHTS
A. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
California has supported and enlarged the common law
public trust rights through express constitutional and statu-
tory provisions. California's constitution places explicit re-
49. Id. at 453.
50. Id. at 435.
51. Variation in public trust doctrine rights has been especially manifest in rec-
ognition of recreational rights. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491
P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971); Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 App. Div. 2d
232, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1960); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232
(1969).
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strictions on the sale of certain tidelands.52  Statutory provi-
sions have changed the restriction to an absolute
prohibition." Public access rights54 have similarly been pro-
tected55 and the common law has been expanded by statute to
include public access anti-discrimination provisions. 56 Addi-
tionally, the California Constitution protects fishing rights58 7
52. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 3 provides:
All tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city, city and county,
or town in this State, and fronting on the water of any harbor, estuary,
bay, or inlet used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from
grant or sale to private persons, partnerships, or corporations; provided,
however, that any such tidelands, reserved to the State solely for street
purposes, which the Legislature finds and declares are not used for navi-
gation purposes and are not necessary for such purposes may be sold to
any town, city, county, city and county, municipal corporations, private
persons, partnerships or corporations subject to such conditions as the
Legislature determines are necessary to be imposed in connection with
any such sales in order to protect the public interest.
53. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 7991 (West 1977) implements the prohibition with
the following language: "The shore and the bed of the ocean or of any navigable
channel or stream or bay or inlet within the State, between ordinary high and low
water marks, over which the ordinary tide ebbs and flows is hereby withheld from
sale."
54. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 provides:
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the
frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable
water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to
such water whenever it is required for any public purpose, nor to de-
stroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water; and the Legislature
shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this
provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall be
always attainable for the people thereof.
See generally Comment, Public Access, supra note 3, at 403-20 (discussing public
access over public trust lands).
55. See, e.g., People v. El Dorado County, 96 Cal. App. 3d 403, 157 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1979) (holding CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 gives the people a constitutional right of
access to navigable streams).
56. CAL. GovT. CODE § 54092 (West 1971).
57. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25 protects public trust fishing rights restating the
common law right to fish and placing restraints on the state's sale of land where the
public fish:
The people shall have the right to fish upon and from the public lands
of the State and in the waters thereof, excepting upon lands set aside for
fish hatcheries, and no land owned by the State shall ever be sold or
transferred without reserving in the people the absolute right to fish
thereupon; and no law shall ever be passed making it a crime for the
people to enter upon the public lands within this State for the purpose
of fishing in any water containing fish that have been planted therein by
the State; provided, that the Legislature may by statute, provide for the
season when and the conditions under which the different species of fish
may be taken.
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and restricts the sale of state lands along navigable waters."'
Section 102 of the California Water Code declares that
"[a]ll water within the State is the property of the people of
the State . . ."5 This statutory provision goes beyond the
common law public trust doctrine by providing a public right
in water per se. As was previously noted, the public must have
a property right or claim of ownership in order for the public
trust doctrine to apply. 0 Section 102 supplies that ownership
right in water and can reasonably be expected to play a key
role in the potential future expansion of the public trust doc-
trine to include ground water, water quality, non-navigable
waters, and water impounded on private property."
B. Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine by State Title
Claims
The states are free to determine whether private land-
owners or the state takes title to lands underlying nontidal
navigable waters.2 If the state elects to hold title it may as-
sert its ownership interest at any point up to the high-water
mark based on the body of water's actual water level at the
time that the state was admitted to the Union.3
For nearly 130 years, California law was unsettled as to
whether or not the state had elected to take title to the state's
34 navigable lakes and 31 navigable rivers." The California
Supreme Court was presented with the issue for the first time
in the Lake Cases. In both State v. Superior Court (Lyon)56
and State v. Superior Court (Fogerty)" landowners relied on
a portion of California Civil Code section 830, enacted in 1872,
which provided that "the owner of the upland,. . . when [the
property] . . . borders on a navigable lake or stream, where
there is no tide, . takes to the edge of the lake or stream, at
58. Id.
59. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
60. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Johnson, Public Trust for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14
U.C.D. L. REv. 233 (1980).
62. See McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 31 (1856).
63. See Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 220, 625 P.2d at 244, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
64. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 216, 625 P.2d at 242, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
65. 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1094
(1981).
66. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1094
(1981).
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the low water mark . . . . 6 In Lyon, the upland property
owner at Clear Lake, California," objected to the state
prohibiting him from reclaiming a marsh between the high
and low-water marks (also referred to as "shorezone"), which
he claimed title to under section 830. In Fogerty,e the upland
property owners along Lake Tahoe, California,0 objected to
the State Lands Commission's 71 proposal to officially record
state claims to the shorezone. The property owners main-
tained that any property interest the state might have had
was conveyed to private landowners by section 830. The state
claimed that section 830 was merely a "rule for the construc-
tion of deeds and does not constitute a grant of sovereign
land."7 2
Illustration I, below, graphically depicts the court's hold-
67. Section 830 provides:
Except where the grant under which the land is held indicates a differ-
ent intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on tidewater, takes
to high-water mark; when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream,
where there is no tide, the owner takes to the edge of the lake or stream,
at the low-water mark; when it borders upon any other water, the owner
takes to the middle of the lake or stream.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 830 (West 1980).
68. Raymond and Margret Lyon, real parties in interest, owned 800 acres of
property along the shoreline. Clear Lake, with a surface area of 64 square miles, is
located in Lake County, California. 29 Cal. 3d at 214, 625 P.2d at 241, 172 Cal. Rptr.
at 698.
69. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1094
(1981).
70. A map of Lake Tahoe, Clear Lake, and other waterways in California ap-
pears in STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS 2 (1979).
71. The legislature has granted the State Lands Commission exclusive authority
over submerged lands:
The commission has exclusive jurisdiction over all ungranted tidelands
and submerged lands owned by the State and of the beds of navigable
rivers, streams, lakes, bays, estuaries, inlets, and straits, including tide-
lands and submerged lands or any interest therein, whether within or
beyond the boundaries of the State as established by law, which have
been or may be acquired by the State (a) by quitclaim, cession, grant,
contract, or otherwise from the United States or any agency thereof, or
(b) by any other means. All jurisdiction and authority remaining in the
State as to tidelands and submerged lands as to which grants have been
or may be made is vested in the commission.
The commission shall exclusively administer and control all such lands,
and may lease or otherwise dispose of such lands, as provided by law,
upon such terms and for such consideration, if any, as are determined
by it ....
CAL. PuR. Rs. CODE § 6301 (West 1977).
72. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 217, 625 P.2d at 243, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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ing in the Lake Cases.
Illustration I
DESCRIPTION:
Above High-Water
Mark (HWM)
HWM ---------
Nontidal
Shorezone
LWM ---------
Below Low-Water
Mark (LWM)
TITLE STATUS:
Private fee simple
absolute
Private fee subject
to Public Trust
Doctrine (Title
conveyed from
State)
State Property
subject to Public
Trust Doctrine
ACTUAL
TOPOGRAPHY:
(submerged land)
Holding of the Lake Cases.
The California Supreme Court held that when California
was admitted to the union with equal footing, took title to the
high-water mark of the state's nontidal navigable waters 8 and
that the public trust doctrine would apply equally to nontidal
navigable waters and tidal waters. 4 The court agreed with the
landowners' position that California Civil Code section 830
conveyed shorezone title to the upland owners.76 The court
reasoned that trust properties so conveyed could only have
the trust burden removed only by specific legislative intent
when made in the furtherance of the trust.7 1 The court there-
73. The court's decision was based on consistent administrative construction of
§ 830. Id. at 225-26, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
74. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
75. Id. at 226, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
76. Id.
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fore held that the shorezone property conveyed under section
830 remained subject to the public trust," as depicted in Il-
lustration I.
The Lake Cases are an example of the technique of ex-
panding the public trust doctrine by state title claim. The
California Supreme Court went beyond the holding in Illinois
Central, using California's former title claim to impose the
public trust doctrine in an area not within the holding of Illi-
nois Central which imposed the trust on submerged land, not
the shorezone. As Justice Clark pointed out in his concurring
and dissenting opinion in Lyons7 8 the court's reading of Illi-
nois Central was strained at best.7 9 Illinois Central "did not
impose a trust on the shorezone." 0 Thus the Lake Cases are
contrary on their face with the holding in Illinois Central.
The United States Supreme Court found the Great Lakes in-
volved in Illinois Central to be "inland seas" of a character
close to that of the ocean.81 The California Supreme Court,
however, applied Illinois Central to all navigable waters, re-
gardless of whether the waters could be characterized as "in-
land seas." s
C. Redefining "Navigable Waters"
The third means by which a state can expand the public
trust doctrine is by increasing the number of waterways avail-
able for public use. Common law holds that the public has the
right to navigate, carry commerce, and fish upon navigable
waters; therefore, any change in the definition of "navigable
waters" will necessarily affect the numbers of waters upon
which the public can exercise their public trust rights.
77. Id. at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (1981). This holding is
likely to produce a plethora of litigation concerning breach of title warranties. In-
stances where property owners warranted title free of easements prior to the Lake
Cases should not, in all fairness, be subject to liability. Litigation over thousands of
titles would be an undue and unnecessary burden on the courts and the public trust
doctrine was not found to previously exist but rather was imposed upon shorezone
property by prescription.
78. Justice Clark agreed that owners of the upland took to the low-water mark;
he disagreed with the majority on the public trust doctrine's application. Id. at 233,
625 P.2d at 253, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
79. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 238, 625 P.2d at 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
80. Id. (quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 450).
81. 146 U.S. at 435.
82. 29 Cal. 3d at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
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As was observed above,88 English common law stated that
"navigable waters" consisted of the area where the ocean tide
"ebbed and flowed. '84 The states have adopted a variety of
standards for finding navigability under law, confirming the
value of this third technique for modifying the public trust
doctrine."'
Although one scholar has volunteered that "a navigable
river is any river with enough water in it to float a Supreme
Court opinion,"'8 and the California Supreme Court once "de-
fined" navigable waters by stating that "all waters are deemed
navigable which are really so,'87 in fact a more useful stan-
dard has emerged. The California courts have progressively
redefined "navigable waters" in order to increase public trust
uses of the state's water resources. 88 The modern California
standard is the "recreational boating test."89 The test signifi-
cantly increases the number of waterways available for public
use over the English "ebb and flow" of the tide test, which
limited navigability to tidal waters.
The California courts have applied the recreational boat-
ing test to expand public trust rights to waters "which are ca-
pable of being navigated by oar or motor-propelled small
craft."90 This redefinition of "navigable waters" indirectly af-
fects the trust doctrine. The fourth method of expanding pub-
lic trust rights, discussed below-judicial declaration of what
uses constitute modern public trust rights-directly affects
the public trust doctrine.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 23-32.
84. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1893).
85. Besides California, the recreational boating test is used by Idaho, Michigan,
Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation and Parks Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 568 n.1,
127 Cal. Rptr. 830, 835 n.1 (1976).
86. C. MEYERS AND A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 240 (1941),
quoted in United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 49 (1976), aff'd, 584 F.2d
378 (1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
87. Churchill Co. v. Kingsbury, 178 Cal. 554, 558, 174 P. 329, 331 (quoting Bar-
ney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876)).
88. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 790, 796 (1971).
89. The "recreational boating test" was first articulated as the "pleasure craft
test" in Lamprey v. State (Metcalf), 52 Minn. 181, 199, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893).
90. People ex rel. Barker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1050, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448,
454 (1971).
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D. Judicial Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine by In-
corporation of New Rights
The fourth method of public trust doctrine modification
is by the incorporation of new rights. The California courts
have expanded the common law rights of commerce, naviga-
tion, and fishing to include access rights, recreational rights,
and the right to preserve public trust property in its natural
condition.91 The California Supreme Court has also recently
affirmed its strict adherence to the prohibition, announced in
Illinois Central, of large public trust land grants to private
ownership."
1. Recreation rights
California courts have substantially expanded the public
trust doctrine by recognizing recreation as a trust use. In the
leading California recreational rights case, Marks v.
Whitney,e" the supreme court identified certain recreational
activities protected by the public trust doctrine: the right to
bathe, swim, and stand on the submerged lands. 4 The court,
however, left open the scope of future uses, noting that the
state is not burdened with enumerating each of the protected
public trust rights," and stated that the doctrine would
remain flexible to meet the public's changing needs." This
flexibility creates an element of uncertainty as to what public
uses will be permitted.
The Marks case is especially relevant to property owners
who now hold title subject to the public trust doctrine under
the Lake Cases. The property owner's title in Marks, as in the
Lake Cases, was subject to the public trust. In the Lake Cases
the California Supreme Court found no compelling reason
why the scope of the public's rights in nontidal waters should
not be equal to its rights held in tidal waters. 7 Landowners
91. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 790, 796 (1971).
92. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
93. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
94. Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also Colberg, Inc. v. California, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (1967).
97. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 230, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
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subject to the Lake Cases holding will therefore be subject to
the same flexible recreation rights test announced in Marks.
2. Preservation rights
In addition to public trust rights for commerce, naviga-
tion, fishing, and recreation, California has incorporated the
right of preservation of trust properties in their "natural
state." The court has noted that public trust properties are
fragile and complex resources which provide vital wildlife
habitats and scientific study areas rich in biological diver-
sity.ee The court has further observed that in addition to con-
cerns over water quality, the public trust properties "are ide-
ally suited for scientific study, since they provide a gene pool
for biological diversity." 9 In light of the foregoing characteris-
tics, and the court's concern that "[i]f nature bats last, wet-
lands may be the natural team's designated hitter,"100 public
trust properties have been impressed with a restriction that
they be preserved in their "natural state."
E. Integration of Public Trust Doctrine and the Appropria-
tion-Riparian System
California operates under the dual system of water rights,
recognizing both the appropriation doctrine and the riparian
doctrine. 01 Thus, while the water is the property of the peo-
ple of the state,10'2 the use of the water is allowed by a riparian
land owner or to anyone diverting the water for a useful, ben-
eficial purpose.108
In the landmark 1983 case of National Audubon Society
v. Superior Court,104 the California Supreme Court held that
the water rights system and the public trust doctrine
are parts of an integrated system of water law. The public
trust doctrine serves the function in that integrated sys-
98. Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d at 245, 625 P.2d at 259, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Nash, Who loves a Swamp?, in UNITED STATES DEn'T. OF AGRI-
CULTURE, STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF FLOODPLAIN WETLANDS
(1978)).
101. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d
709, 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 361 (1983).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 441-42, 558 P.2d at 724-25, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62.
104. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
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tern of preserving the continuing sovereign power of the
state to protect public trust uses, . .and imposes a con-
tinuing duty on the state to take such uses into account
in allocating water resources. 105
National Audubon mandates that the water uses under
the appropriative water rights system must now be reevalu-
ated and considered in tandem with the public trust doctrine
rights and uses'" described above. Previously, riparian or ap-
propriative users did not have to be concerned with the effect
of their water use on public trust waters.
The impact of the court's decision in National Audubon
should not be underestimated. Any use of water, whether ri-
parian or appropriative, will be subject to a balancing against
the public trust doctrine. "No vested rights bar such reconsid-
eration.' 10 7 The court's decision provides members of the pub-
lic with a new right: challenging any use of water which indi-
rectly affects their trust rights.
In National Audubon, the court did not dictate any par-
ticular allocation of water for Mono Lake.108 While indicating
that "uses protected by the public trust doctrine . . . deserve
to be taken into account,"'09 the court did not articulate an
appropriate balancing test, recognizing that its opinion "is but
one step in the eventual resolution of the.., controversy.' '1
The balancing test herein proposed suggests the next logical
step in evaluating public trust controversies: a weighing and
balancing of public and private interests. This balancing test
is of even greater importance and necessity due to the final
method by which states can expand the public trust doctrine:
by prescription.
IV. PUBLIC TRUST BY PRESCRIPTION: CALIFORNIA ADOPTS A
SIXTH PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE EXPANSION TECHNIQUE
The previous section of this comment discussed five tech-
niques which states historically have used to expand the pub-
lic trust doctrine. In the Lake Cases, the California Supreme
Court recognized a sixth technique which had not previously
105. Id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
106. Id. at 447, 452, 658 P.2d at 728, 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365, 369.
107. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 729, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
108. Id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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received wide application by other jurisdictions:... the public's
acquisition of trust rights by prescription. The following dis-
cussion suggests that the supreme court applied the public
trust doctrine by prescription without adequate analysis; that
the court acted contrary to the intent of the people, as ex-
pressed by the state legislature; and that in so doing, the court
has aggravated the unresolved conflict between public trust
uses and private landowners' rights.
A. Legal Requirements for Establishing Prescriptive Rights
Under California law, property rights can be acquired in
any of five ways. 1 2 One of the five means is by adverse use or
occupancy. California case law1 ' sets down four requirements
to be met to establish adverse use. The use must be open and
notorious, continuous and uninterrupted for a period of five
years, hostile to the true owner, and under a claim of right.
"4
The burden of proof for establishing each of the requirements
is on the party asserting the claim.11'
In order to satisfy the requirement of continuous use,
daily use need not be shown; the court of appeals has stated
that there must not be a break in the essential attitude of
mind required for adverse use." e If members of the public be-
lieve they can use the land, and their occasional or periodic
use is not prohibited by the true owner, continuous use is
found.
B. The Lake Cases: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine by
Prescription
When the California Supreme Court in the Lake Cases
considered whether the state could impose public trust rights
by prescription, there was "no direct authority. . in Califor-
nia"11 7 for guidance. The issue arose because the water level in
both lakes involved had been artificially raised since Califor-
111. See infra notes 120-21.
112. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1006 (West 1970).
113. See, e.g., Zimmer v. Dyustra, 39 Cal. App. 3d 422, 432, 114 Cal. Rptr. 380,
386 (1974).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting RETATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 459 comment to subsection (1)
(1944)).
117. Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d at 248, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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nia acquired statehood in 1850.'"6 Since the state originally
took title only to the high-water mark as it existed in 1850,
the subsequent artificial rise in the water level caused the
shorezone to incrementally encompass private property. The
common law concept of the public trust doctrine does not ap-
ply to this "new" shorezone because title was never held by
the state as trustee.
The supreme court based its holding in the Lake Cases,
that the privately owned "new" shorezone was subject to the
public trust doctrine, on the acquisition of a prescriptive ease-
ment.110 Considering the potential impact of this innovative
holding, there is scant explanation of the court's rationale in
the opinion. The court's reliance on a 1918 Arkansas opin-
ion 10 and a 1937 Iowa opinion 21 without discussing their par-
ticular application to California land is especially
disturbing.1 22
As discussed below, the court's application of the public
trust doctrine by prescription suffers from two major defects.
First, the requirements of finding prescriptive rights under
California law were not satisfied. Second, the application of
the public trust doctrine by prescription is contrary to the
people's intent. This is particularly irksome because the peo-
ple are the intended trust beneficiaries.
1. Prescription Requirements not Satisfied
The state also failed to establish the continuous use re-
quirement. Until the Lake Cases, the public had no legal right
to go upon private property except when the land was suffi-
ciently covered with water to permit navigation. As noted
118. Id. The dam in Lake Tahoe has been in existence since 1870. Id.
119. The court first took judicial notice of the "monumental evidentiary prob-
lem" before turning to a consideration of prescription. Both factors were considered
when the court held "under all circumstances" the court would apply the public trust
doctrine to the high water mark. Id. at 248-49, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
120. State v. Parker, 132 Ark. 316, 200 S.W. 1014 (1918).
121. State v. Sorenson, 222 Iowa 1248, 271 N.W. 234 (1937).
122. The court may have been "gun shy" after the adverse reaction of the pub-
lic and legal community to their holding in Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29,
465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970), where private property was unexpectedly de-
clared subject to a continuous easement. See, e.g., Berger, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz:
A License to Steal?, CAL. ST. B. J. 24 (1974); Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last-at least
They Lose Their Property, 8 CAL. W.L. Rlv. 75 (1971); Shavelson, Gion v. Santa
Cruz: Where do We Go from Here?, 47 CAL. ST. B. J. 415 (1972); Comment, A Threat
to California's Shoreline, SANTA CLARA L. Rxv. 327 (1971).
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above, in order to meet the continuous requirement, members
of the public must have had an "attitude of mind" where they
reasonably believed they could use the property at issue
whenever they desired and without the landowner's objec-
tions.12 3 Since the public was frequently excluded by private
property owners when the water receded, the public could not
have had an "attitude of mind" sufficient to meet the continu-
ous use requirement.
The final requirement for finding a prescriptive right,
that the use be "hostile," was also not satisfied. The mere
presence of water upon a landowner's property does not nec-
essarily cause a finding of hostile or adverse use, even where
the water stimulates the growth of marshland plants and
other vegetation.1 '4 The water's presence may have benefitted
the landowner by increasing fishing and other recreational
uses, and providing agricultural irrigation water and crop
nutrients.
Assuming the supreme court found that the water's peri-
odic presence was sufficient to vest a prescriptive right in the
parties controlling the water level, it does not follow that the
public trust doctrine should also apply. It is settled California
law that "[e]asements acquired by adverse use are limited to
the uses made during the prescriptive period. Thereafter no
different or greater use can be made of them .. ,. . The
holding in the Lake Cases is contrary to this position. Declar-
ing private property subject to the public trust and its in-
creasing number of public uses is by far "a different and
greater use" than the passive public right to periodically in-
troduce water onto private property. Unlike public trust doc-
trine rights, imposition of a prescriptive right for raising the
water level periodically should not include public use rights,
natural land preservation rights, and title transfer restrictions.
2. Prescription is Contrary to the Public's Intent
The second defect in the court's application of the public
trust doctrine by prescription is that it is contrary to the peo-
ple's intent as expressed by legislation.
The supreme court's ruling in Gion v. City of Santa
123. See supra text accompanying note 118.
124. See, e.g., Phillips v. Burne, 133 Cal. App. 2d 700, 284 P.2d 809 (1955).
125. Beyl v. Kasukochi, 135 Cal. App. 2d 638, 640, 287 P.2d 863, 865 (1955).
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Cruz,"" where private beach property was found to be im-
pliedly dedicated to public use, caused many landowners to
prohibit public access to their beachfront and shorezone prop-
erty rather than risk being found to have impliedly dedicated
their property to the public. The state legislature viewed the
private landowners' reaction as undesirable, and thereafter
enacted Civil Code section 1009 to provide a "safe harbor" for
private landowners to allow public use on their property.
Section 1009 of the Civil Code 117 provides that it is in the
state's interest to encourage private landowners to make their
property available for public use."' The legislature noted,
however, that such action by a private landowner could cloud
his title.12 9 To prevent private landowners from withdrawing
their property from public use in anticipation of title
problems, it therefore provided that "no use of such property
after [19711 ...shall ever ripen to confer upon the public or
any governmental body or unit a vested right to continue to
make such use permanently....",,0
The court's holding in the Lake Cases runs contrary to
the intent of this legislation. By finding that public trust
rights can be acquired by prescription, the court has once
again encouraged private landowners to withhold their prop-
erty from public use. As a practical effect, owners of property
suited for recreation, especially private lakes, may fence off
their property to prevent the imposition of public trust rights
by prescription.
3. A "Blunderbuss" Application
In a concurring and dissenting opinion Justice Clark rec-
ognized the importance of protecting shorezone property in
California'' but viewed the majority's application of the pub-
lic trust doctrine to all 4,000 miles of California shorezone
property as a "blunderbuss" approach.8 2 In Clark's view, the
Lake Cases holding threatened valuable existing residential
126. 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970). See supra note 122.
127. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1009 (West Supp. 1980).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 238, 625 P.2d 239, 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 713 (1981)(Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
132. Id.
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and agricultural use on millions of acres.1"' The analysis below
proposes a new balancing test to resolve the impending threat
which could result from an overbroad application of the pub-
lic trust doctrine.
C. A New Balancing Test for the Public Trust Doctrine
Current application of the public trust doctrine recog-
nizes navigation, commerce, fishing, recreation, and natural
area preservation as valuable public rights. Historically, the
courts have used a balancing test when public and private
uses of trust land conflict." 4 However, when public trust
properties are put to uses which are not within the scope of
the doctrine, such as for agricultural purposes, "a balancing of
values is not the test under the doctrine. The test is a lack of
value for trust purposes."13 5 The dichotomy between recog-
nized public trust uses and other unrecognized uses can pro-
duce anomalous results.186
The application of the public trust doctrine to 4,000 miles
of shorezone constituting millions of acres1 87 emphasizes the
need for a new test which balances both public and private
uses. Much of the private property in the Lake Cases held
subject to the public trust had been put to productive agricul-
tural and residential use, uses not within the public trust. It
is unclear whether these uses will be prohibited after the Lake
Cases decisions. The supreme court stated that property own-
ers may utilize their land in any manner not incompatible
with the public's interest in the property.3 8 The opinion
seems to indicate that the focus will be on incompatibility of
private and public trust uses, but the court neither articulates
any evaluation standards nor proposes a new balancing test. It
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Ex parte Bailey, 155 Cal. 472, 476, 101 P. 441, 442-43 (1909)
(fishing rights balanced against preservation rights); Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng.
Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821) (swimming rights balanced against navigation and fishing
rights). Integration of the water rights system with the public trust doctrine has been
viewed by at least one authority as involving a balancing of these two systems against
each other. See L.A. Daily J., Feb. 18, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
135. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 237, 625 P.2d 239, 255, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 712
(Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
136. See, e.g., Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 198, 273 P.2d 797 (1928) (upholds
use of public trust property for oil and gas prospecting).
137. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 216, 625 P.2d at 242, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
138. Id. at 232, 625 P.2d at 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
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is possible that the court viewed any non-public trust use as
incompatible, and the opinion was merely a restatement of
the current balancing test which does not recognize any non-
public trust uses.
A new balancing test should be employed by the courts
and the Water Resources Board to resolve conflict between
public trust doctrine use rights and other uses which private
landowners or public entities would like to make or may cur-
rently be making of trust resources. The balancing test pro-
posed below consists of five weighted factors, each designed to
remove uncertainty regarding the application of the public
trust doctrine.3 9
Initially, courts should accord current public trust uses
the greatest weight. Current public trust uses should be of
paramount importance because public trust property is held
for the people's benefit. Private or municipal benefits, includ-
ing upstream water appropriation, should not be made at sig-
nificant cost to current trust uses. Second, consideration
should be given to potential public trust uses. The state, act-
ing as trustee for the people, should ensure that public trust
resources are protected, and are available for the use and en-joyment of future generations. The third factor for considera-
tion is a closely allied concept: use compatibility. This factor
is based on a broad reading of the Lake Cases, where the
court stated that landowners could use their property so long
as such use was not incompatible with public trust rights. 140
Since the preservation right is especially susceptible to perma-
nent loss or diminution in value,' uses which could poten-
tially impinge on the preservation of trust property should be
subject to close scrutiny, and greater weight should be given
to protecting trust property from irreversible environmental
harm.
Fourth, the reasonable expectations of private landown-
139. The proposed balancing test was partially derived from the California Su-
preme Court's holding in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d
362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980). In City of Berkeley, the court used a balancing test to
determine if property should be excluded completely from the public trust doctrine.
Id. at 534, 606 P.2d at 373, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The balancing test proposed herein
differs from that utilized by the court in City of Berkeley in that the proposed bal-
ancing test does not suggest eliminating property from the public trust, but rather
evaluating competing uses and rights within the trust.
140. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 232, 625 P.2d at 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
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ers, municipal entities, and the public should be taken into
consideration. If the public reasonably expects that limited
non-public trust uses, such as residential or agricultural uses,
would be made of privately owned trust property, and all
other test factors have been satisfied, such uses should be al-
lowed. Reasonable water appropriation would therefore be
permitted. Additionally, consideration should be given to the
appropriators' or landowners' reliance upon previous law and
the historical use of the resource. As noted above, landowners
believed the shorezone was private property for more than 100
years and the public trust doctrine was thought to have been
subsumed under the water rights system.1 4 2 Proposed water
appropriation and non-public trust uses, as contrasted with
those historical uses arising before the Lake Cases and Na-
tional Audubon Society, should not receive as much weight
under the balancing test. This factor goes to the reasonable-
ness of the landowners' or appropriators' expectations.
Finally, the court should consider whether appropriation
or private use of trust property would constitute a significant
diminution in the amount of land or water locally available
upon which the public could exercise its trust rights. This fac-
tor takes into consideration the variety and optimal utility of
public trust lands in a particular community.
After weighing the above factors, the court or the Water
Resources Board could equitably resolve the problems arising
from the expansion of public rights on private property and
ease the conflicts between the public trust doctrine and Cali-
fornia's water rights system.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE
Initially, it was observed in this comment that the public
trust doctrine has evolved over a period of two thousand years
in a variety of legal systems. It was proposed that the states
have utilized five techniques to expand the public trust doc-
trine: through constitutional and statutory provisions; state ti-
tle claims; expanding the redefinition of "navigable waters;"
judicial incorporation of new rights; and integration with the
water rights system. Further, it was proposed that California
142. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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had adopted a sixth technique, public trust rights by
prescription.
This application of the public trust doctrine under the
Lake Cases to millions of acres of California land for the first
time, and the integration of the public trust doctrine and the
water rights system under National Audubon Society, has
emphasized the need for the courts and the Water Resources
Board to employ a broad balancing test. The proposed test, by
taking into consideration any use which was not incompatible
with the public trust doctrine, would permit the continued
residential and agricultural use of some privately owned pub-
lic trust lands and resolve the uncertainty of how public trust
rights should be balanced against nontrust and water rights
system uses.
The Lake Cases represent a significant step in the public
trust doctrine's development. The court, by recognizing pre-
scriptive public trust rights, has acknowledged for the first
time that the public can acquire trust rights in private prop-
erty by prescription, without regard to title origin. Before the
Lake Cases, an essential requirement for finding a public
trust right was that the state originally held property title as
trustee. ,43 Regardless of one's perspective on the public trust
doctrine, this limitation is now removed in California.
The other requirement in American jurisprudence is that
the doctrine be applied only to natural resources involving
water. The public trust doctrine need not be limited in this
way. Under ancient Roman law public trust rights included
non-water resources of a communal interest.
The public trust doctrine, with two thousand years of his-
torical momentum and recognition behind it, could develop
into a comprehensive resource management tool capable of
protecting all natural resources. The California Supreme
Court's recognition of public trust rights by prescription
removes one of the obstacles for such an expansion of the doc-
trine. In the wake of the Lake Cases, we are one step closer to
a doctrine which embraces all natural resources and which can
overcome the impediments of private ownership in resource
143. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
19831
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protection when properly balanced against private property
rights.
Ted J. Hannig
